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The intimate geographies of panic disorder: parsing anxiety 
through psychopharmacological dissection  
 
By Felicity Callard* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The category of panic disorder was significantly indebted to 
early psychopharmacological experiments (in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s) by the psychiatrist Donald Klein, in 
collaboration with Max Fink.  Klein’s technique of 
“psychopharmacological dissection” underpinned his 
transformation of clinical accounts of anxiety, and was central 
in effecting the shift from agoraphobic anxiety (with its spatial 
imaginary of city squares and streets) to panic. This technique 
disaggregated the previously unitary  affect of anxiety—as 
advanced in psychoanalytic accounts—into two physiological 
and phenomenological kinds. “Psychopharmacological 
dissection” depended on particular modes of clinical 
observation to assess drug action and to interpret patient 
behavior. The “intimate geographies” out of which panic 
disorder emerged comprised both the socio-spatial dynamics of 
observation on the psychiatric ward, and Klein’s use of John 
Bowlby’s model of separation anxiety—as it played out 
between the dyad of infant and mother—to interpret his adult 
patients’ affectively disordered behavior. The article, in 
 2 
offering an historical geography of mid-twentieth century 
anxiety and panic, emphasizes the importance of socio-spatial 
setting in understanding how clinical and scientific 
experimentation opens up new ways in which affects can be 
expressed, shaped, observed, and understood.  
 3 
Mary J.’s panic 
In 1981, in the popular psychology magazine Psychology Today, psychiatrists Paul Wender 
and Donald Klein heralded the promise of biological psychiatry by emphasizing that 
revelations about the centrality of biological malfunctions in mental illness would show many 
of the tenets of psychodynamic theory to be “irrelevant or even misleading.”1 They 
illuminated their argument with brief case histories. One was of a twenty-three-year-old 
agoraphobic woman whom they called Mary J. She was an unmarried buyer for a department 
store who was suffering from debilitating panic attacks: “She would suddenly be overcome 
by dizziness, a pounding heart, and an inability to catch her breath while walking down the 
street or riding on public transportation.”2 Wender and Klein noted that physiologically-
oriented specialists had tended to diagnose her as suffering from nerves or a virus, and had 
been unable to help Mary J. when she stopped using subways and buses in favor of taxis, 
ensconced herself in her parents’ home, and gave up her job. Mary J., feeling increasingly 
desperate, sought a psychoanalyst. Wender and Klein reported that on the couch: 
 
she began to suspect that the panics might be related to a love affair. Six weeks before 
the attacks started, she had been quite upset: her lover had moved to another city. The 
analyst closed in on that possibility with penetrating questions. Had her sexual 
adjustment been guilt-free after she had begun the affair? Didn’t her fear of being out 
on the street reflect her unconscious doubts about her sexual self-control—that is, her 
fear of identification as a streetwalker? Didn’t her clinging dependence on her family 
                                                 
1
 Paul Wender and Donald Klein, “The Promise of Biological Psychiatry,” Psychology 
Today, February 1981, 25.  
2
 Ibid., 31.  
 4 
show her fear of adulthood and her unconscious desire to substitute her father for 
other men?
3
 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. The reference to “her fear of identification as a streetwalker” alludes to psychoanalytic 
models of agoraphobia. Freud, in his letter to Wilhelm Fliess of December 17, 1896, wrote: 
“I actually confirmed a conjecture I had entertained for some time concerning the mechanism 
of agoraphobia in women. No doubt you will guess it if you think of ‘public’ women. It is the 
repression of the intention to take the first man one meets in the street: envy of prostitution 
and identification” (Sigmund Freud and Wilhelm Fliess, The Complete Letters of Sigmund 
Freud to Wilhelm Fliess, 1887-1904, trans. Jeffrey  Moussaieff Masson (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 217–218. While Freud himself wrote little 
specifically on agoraphobia, the associations he made between agoraphobia and sexual 
fantasies regarding the street were taken up by the next generation of psychoanalysts; for 
example, see Walter Schmideberg, “Agoraphobia as a Manifestation of Schizophrenia: The 
Analysis of a Case,” Psychoanalytic Review 38, no. 4 (October 1951): 342–52. The figure of 
a woman who sequesters herself indoors and thereby removes herself from circulation in the 
public sphere has appeared a number of times in twentieth-century psychiatric and 
psychological writings on phobias and anxiety. In 1964, for example, A. H. Roberts brought 
to visibility the figure of “the housebound housewife” in a retrospective study of married 
women in London (A. H. Roberts, “Housebound Housewives––A Follow-Up Study of a 
Phobic Anxiety State,” British Journal of Psychiatry 110, no. 465 (March 1964): 191–97; see 
also subsequent research on this figure by psychiatrist and behavioural therapist Tom Kraft 
(for example, “Sexual Factors in the Development of the Housebound Housewife 
Syndrome,” Journal of Sex Research 6, no. 1 (February 1970): 59–63). Understanding the 
overdetermined way in which gender, class, and the articulation of the public and private 
sphere are – within modernity – bound up, one with the other is, I would argue, central to 
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Mary J. spent four years “rework[ing] such baroque structures” while her symptoms came 
and went. In the end, she left the analyst disillusioned and turned to behavior therapy, a 
newer, shorter, and cheaper form of treatment. Wender and Klein described how she was 
given instruction in relaxation exercises and desensitization—exposure to public places—and 
how, despite initial progress, the panic attacks returned with a vengeance. Mary J. and her 
parents were, by then, reportedly desperate and resigned to her becoming a long-term invalid. 
But Wender and Klein reported that only a year later, she had experienced a profound 
affective and social transformation: she was living in the city on her own in an apartment, had 
returned to her job, and was excited about possible marriage plans. (Let us notice, here, how 
effective therapeutics transforms ‘bad’ affect into ‘good’, such that equanimity and happiness 
are demonstrated through a turn to normative forms of sociality [returning to a job; excitedly 
focusing on marriage].) What had happened? The psychopharmacologists revealed that Mary 
J. had volunteered to join a clinical experiment for the treatment of phobias that involved 
taking an antidepressant medication. The drug had stopped the panic attacks and 
accompanying psychotherapy had “helped her to control her anticipatory anxiety and allowed 
her to resume normal activities.” The symptoms, we are told, did not return when Mary J. 
stopped taking the medication six months later.  
Wender and Klein’s vignette of Mary J. was in the service of their own strong 
commitment to the effectiveness of biological psychiatry—and as such demanded a 
disparagement of other clinical approaches to agoraphobia, particularly that of 
psychoanalysis, and a narrative that culminated in the triumphant success of drug therapy. 
Their article was published a year after the American Psychiatric Association had anointed 
                                                                                                                                                       
understanding histories of fear and anxiety – both within and beyond the domains of science 
and medicine.  
 6 
the new category of panic disorder in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM–III)—a category that had been brought into being in large 
part through Donald Klein’s psychopharmacological research that stretched back to the late 
1950s, and whose triumphant arrival on the stage of American—and subsequently 
international—psychiatry was, after a long journey, undoubtedly ensured by Robert Spitzer 
(the Chair of the DSM–III Task Force) selecting Klein to join the Task Force on 
Nomenclature and Statistics.
4
  
Wender and Klein’s article should be read not only as a celebration of drug treatment 
as cure, but of drug treatment as diagnostic dissection tool. Wender and Klein’s article not 
only celebrated how psychopathological affect might be successfully treated via drugs, but 
exemplified a more wide-ranging logic, developed in large part by Klein, and assembled from 
both empirical and conceptual elements, in which the very shape and timbre of that 
psychopathological affect might be identified and parsed through drugs.
5
 In the same year 
that Wender and Klein mused in print over Mary J.’s panic, Klein, in a chapter intended for a 
scientific readership, celebrated what he considered his analytical and methodological 
breakthrough, namely, “the power of the experimental technique of pharmacological 
dissection whereby one can pierce through the fascinating, confusing web of symptoms and 
                                                 
4
 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
3rd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1980). See Hannah S. Decker, The Making of DSM-III: A 
Diagnostic Manual’s Conquest of American Psychiatry (New York, 2013), Chaps 4 and 5. 
5
 Klein was of course operating as part of a much larger collectivity of researchers grappling 
with how best to conceptualize and describe drug action. Nonetheless, there was something 
singular as well as compelling about how he formulated his model of 
“psychopharmacological dissection,” which buttressed what would become a new 
nosological entity. 
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dysfunctions to tease out the major participant variables by attending to specific drug 
effects.”6 It was a bold claim that came to inaugurate and cement a new approach to the study 
of anxiety. Klein’s pharmacological interventions had, he averred, disinterred panic 
disorder—a phenomenon, and a very particular manifestation of pathological affect, that had 
hitherto remained largely ignored by dint of erroneous formulations concerning agoraphobia. 
What might dwelling on this particular moment – the disinterring of an emotion by a 
clinician and a scientist via his observation and analysis of drug effects  – contribute to our 
understandings of the long history of models and experiences of fear, anxiety, and phobias? 
Otniel Dror and colleagues, in their introduction to this volume, ask whether “the discrete 
scientific developments structure the expression, experience, visibility, or nature of 
emotions?”7 While panic as a phenomenon and a topic of concern in the history of science 
and medicine stretches far further back than Klein’s post-Second-World-War drug 
experiments, the emergence of panic disorder arguably established   a new way through 
which manifestations of overwhelming, negative affect – experienced by individuals in 
particular socio-spatial settings – could be understood, narrated and, indeed, experienced. If 
agoraphobia as a term consistently posed the question of the agora (Why did it provoke fear? 
How ought it to be construed?), panic disorder posed questions about the ontology of the 
affective phenomenon – panic – itself. Klein himself argued that drug action allowed the 
observation of two ontologically distinct kinds of anxiety (anticipatory anxiety and panic), 
that had been conflated in earlier models and theorizations of anxiety. We, as historians of 
                                                 
6
 Donald F. Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized,” in Anxiety: New Research and Changing 
Concepts, ed. Klein, Donald F. and Rabkin, Judith G. (New York, 1981), 242. 
7
 Otniel E. Dror, Betinna Hitzer, Anja Laukötter, Pilar León-Sanz, “History of Science and 
the Emotions: Perspectives and Challenges––An Introduction,” Osiris, forthcoming, [p. 17 in 
manuscript].  
 8 
science and of the emotions, might, rather, continue to ponder over whether the particular 
socio-spatial arrangement of those psychiatric wards – one which meshed patients’ 
physiologies, pharmacological action, patient and staff behaviour, and practices of 
observation – structured the very way in which particular affects came to be expressed, 
shaped, and understood.  
I will be particularly attentive, here, to the need to understand how geography figures 
both in the production of psychopathological affects, and in clinical and scientific accounts of 
those psychopathological affects. The socio-spatial assemblage of epistemological, 
methodological and observational techniques that underpinned Klein’s work of 
psychopharmacological dissection operated significantly differently from the one that, since 
the 1870s, had at its centre a clinician puzzling over how to understand and interpret the 
actions as well as the affective distress of a figure attempting to navigate his way through an 
urban, public landscape that he could not comfortably inhabit or traverse.
8
 The neurologist 
and psychiatrist Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal, who originated the term agoraphobia in the 
early 1870s, for example, opened his seminal essay by describing how, “for some years 
patients have repeatedly approached [him] with the peculiar complaint that it is not possible 
for them to walk across open spaces and through certain streets and that, due to the fear of 
such paths, they are troubled in their freedom of movement.”9 Westphal’s task, and that, 
                                                 
8
 Note that I have used “he” here. Part of the complex history of gender in relation to 
agoraphobia is addressed in Felicity Callard, “Understanding Agoraphobia: Women, Men, 
and the Historical Geography of Urban Anxiety,” in Exploring Women’s Studies: Looking 
Forward, Looking Back, by Berkin, Carol, Pinch, Judith, and Appel, Carol (Upper Saddle 
River, N.J., 2006), 201–17. 
9
 Carl Friedrich Otto Westphal and Terry J. Knapp, Westphal’s “Die Agoraphobie” with 
Commentary: The Beginnings of Agoraphobia, trans. Michael T. Schumacher (Lanham, 
 9 
subsequently, of many neurologists and psychoanalysts who saw agoraphobic patients in 
their consulting rooms and in outpatient clinics in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, was to respond to those patients’ phenomenologically rich accounts of their inability 
to move through open squares and down particular streets. Those narratives bound 
agoraphobic anxiety tightly to particular urban locales: Westphal, for example, memorably 
recounted features of the Berlin cityscape (including particular squares, as well as the 
Charlottenburg zoo) that precipitated extensive fear in the three agoraphobic individuals 
whose case histories he enumerated in his 1871 article.
10
 The logic outlined by Klein 
emerged out of a different socio-spatial world. It was at some distance both from Westphal’s 
symbols and markers of nineteenth-century urbanicity, and from the sedate consulting rooms 
of neurologists and psychoanalysts; it entailed different dynamics of clinical observation. If, 
for Westphal, the figure, gestures, and affective tenor of “the agoraphobe” provoked clinical 
intrigue by dint of his stalled passage across the public spaces of the agora, Klein’s 
archetypal, phobic-anxiety figure emerged within the claustral spaces of a mental hospital. 
What would come to define him or her would not be, as in the case of Westphal’s patients, an 
uncomfortable relationship to walls, passageways, and public squares, but panic attacks, 
helplessness and the need for a reassuring, parent-like figure. Thus while Wender and Klein’s 
                                                                                                                                                       
M.D., 1988), 59. The German original is Westphal, Carl F.O., “Die Agoraphobie: Eine 
Neuropathische Erscheinung,” Archiv Für Psychiatrie Und Nervenkrankheiten 3 (1871): 
138–61. Westphal’s other writing on agoraphobia included “Über Platzfurcht. Briefliche 
Mitteilungen,” Archiv Für Nervenkrankheiten 7 (1877): 377–83; “Nachtrag Zu Dem Aufsatze 
‘Über Agoraphobie,’” Archiv Für Psychiatrie Und Nervenkrankheiten 3 (1872): 219–21. 
10
 Westphal, Carl F.O., “Die Agoraphobie” (cit., n. 8). See also Felicity Callard, “‘The 
Sensation of Infinite Vastness’; Or, the Emergence of Agoraphobia in the Late 19th 
Century,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 24, no. 6 (2006): 873–89. 
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plot regarding Mary J. in Psychology Today commenced with the puzzle of her 
breathlessness on city streets, neither Klein’s own practices of observation, nor his 
investigatory frameworks, were centrally preoccupied with the textures and socio-spatial 
specificities of the urban landscape. How Klein’s logic came to be articulated and how the 
framework in which it was housed worked is what I shall track in this article. If histories of 
the emotions have provided many nuanced accounts of how temporality is construed and 
mobilized in different models of particular affects, there has perhaps been less explicit 
attention to spatiality.
11
 This essay is intended, then, as a contribution to the historical 
geography of the emotions: I am particularly interested in how Klein worked with, and 
characterized in a particular way, his anxious patients’ experiences of the inpatient ward, as 
well as how the diagnosis of panic disorder dispensed with an explicit emphasis on the 
subject’s relationship to space (cf. agoraphobia).   
 
*    *    *    *    *  
Wender and Klein’s vignette of Mary J. represented in schematic form the trajectory 
that approaches to agoraphobia, and agoraphobic anxiety, took in the United States in the 
second half of the twentieth century. That trajectory moved from the hegemony of 
psychoanalytic or psychodynamic approaches, to the markedly different therapies and 
etiological arguments of the behaviorists, to the near inescapability of psychopharmacology 
                                                 
11
 Though for an account that takes seriously the problems of both temporality and spatiality 
in providing a finely-grained history of how the affective “accidents of everyday existence” 
were “transformed into the objects of psychiatric epidemiology,” see Rhodri Hayward, 
“Sadness in Camberwell: Imagining Stress and Constructing History in Post-war Britain,” in 
Stress, Shock, and Adaptation in the Twentieth Century, ed. Cantor, David and Edmund 
Ramsden (Rochester, N.Y.: Rochester University Press), 320–342.   
 11 
for the understanding and treatment of anxiety, panic and phobias.
12
 As different therapeutic 
regimens jostled for pre-eminence, they were accompanied by different models of phobic 
anxiety: those models worked with a variety of phenomenologies of psychopathological 
affect, of the kinds of individuals who were most susceptible to being gripped by such affect, 
of narratives about how such affect would manifest on and through the body, and of what 
precipitated and maintained those manifestations of affect. Those models were subtended by 
both implicit and explicit claims about the kind of clinical expert, and the kind of 
observational practices in which he or she was proficient, appropriately to identify and then 
to intervene upon that affect. 
I shall be interested in analysing specifically how Donald Klein’s early 
psychopharmacological research—conducted in collaboration with the psychiatrist and 
clinical researcher Max Fink—helped to transform the technics and conceptual apparatus for 
observing, identifying and parsing psychopathological manifestations of anxiety.
13
 There has 
                                                 
12
 Up to the 1950s–1960s, most clinicians in the United States aligned themselves directly or 
indirectly either with the work of Freud or with the psychobiological or psycho-social 
approaches of those such as Adolph Meyer and William Menninger. The late 1950s was a 
period of great transformation in the American psychiatric establishment. Psychoanalysis was 
facing attacks from several quarters: behaviorists accused psychoanalysts of unscientific 
methods, and proposed very different models of fear and anxiety that derived from the early 
twentieth-century classical conditioning experiments of those such as Ivan Pavlov. Prominent 
amongst them was Joseph Wolpe, who developed methods of behavioral densensitization to 
phobic objects (see his Psychotherapy by Reciprocal Inhibition (Stanford, Calif., 1958)). 
13
 Other historical and sociological investigations of agoraphobia and anxiety include 
Anthony Vidler, Warped Space Art, Architecture, and Anxiety in Modern Culture 
(Cambridge, Mass., 2000); Paul Carter, Repressed Spaces: The Poetics of Agoraphobia 
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been, surprisingly, relatively little fine-grained historical work that has focused specifically 
on the imbrication of observational and epistemological frameworks in mid-twentieth century 
psychiatry, and its centrality in grounding not only particular diagnostic entities and/or 
symptoms but particular conceptualizations of psychopathological affect.
14
 This article 
intends to make a contribution to that body of literature. 
My argument relies on analyses of published documentation. It therefore reckons 
with, as well as potentially further embeds, the rhetorical power of Klein’s and Fink’s written 
arguments—whether in journal articles reporting their empirical findings, or in retrospective 
narrative accounts of the discovery of psychopharmacological dissection. I am aware of the 
gap that undoubtedly exists between those tidied, published accounts, and the actual, 
heterogeneous practices of observation that would have taken place in the clinical spaces that 
                                                                                                                                                       
(London, 2002); Jackie Orr, Panic Diaries: A Genealogy of Panic Disorder (Durham, N.C., 
2006); Callard, “‘The Sensation of Infinite Vastness'” (cit. n. 9); Kathryn Milun, Pathologies 
of Modern Space: Empty Space, Urban Anxiety, and the Recovery of the Public Self (New 
York, 2007); Shelley Zipora Reuter, Narrating Social Order: Agoraphobia and the Politics 
of Classification (Toronto, Ont., 2007). 
14
 Let me be clear. There are of course historical, anthropological and sociological studies 
that have attended carefully to psychiatric case records to demonstrate how diagnostic 
categories were made (e.g. Jonathan Metzl, The Protest Psychosis: How Schizophrenia 
Became a Black Disease (Boston, 2009)). However, relatively few have analysed how 
particular epistemological frameworks were bound up with certain practices of observation 
and their eliciting and interpretation of particular data. One example that focuses on late 
nineteenth-century psychiatric nosology is Kathleen M. Brian, “‘Occasionally Heard to Be 
Answering Voices’: Aural Culture and the Ritual of Psychiatric Audition, 1877–1911,” 
History of Psychiatry 23, no. 3 (September 1, 2012): 305–17. 
 13 
acted as the crucible for the development of Klein and Fink’s conceptual architecture. 
Nonetheless, given the centrality of the scalpellic logic of psychopharmacological dissection 
to the emergence of panic disorder, and the surprising dearth of theoretico-historical 
elaborations of that logic in the history of psychiatry, close consideration of the workings of 
those published texts is, I argue, justified.
15
    
  
How do the drugs act? 
The synthesis of chlorpromazine in 1951, and its arrival on the psychiatric scene in 
France in 1952, was a key moment in the development of psychopharmacology. It was 
                                                 
15
 Klein’s early experiments with Max Fink are discussed and analysed in David Healy, The 
Antidepressant Era (Cambridge, Mass., 1997), 191–93; Orr, Panic Diaries (cit. n. 11), 170–
172; 205–209. Neither systematically addresses the logic underlying the observational 
practices underpinning Klein’s “psychopharmacological dissection.” 
 I am sympathetic to Viola Balz’s arguments vis-à-vis the dangers of relying on 
published material by and interviews with psychiatrists and other scientific researchers (Viola 
Balz, “Terra Incognita: An Historiographic Approach to the First Chlorpromazine Trials 
Using Patient Records of the Psychiatric University Clinic in Heidelberg,” History of 
Psychiatry 22, no. 86 Pt 2 (June 2011): 182–200). As she rightly notes, this ends up silencing 
the patient’s voice, and rendering invisible the complex relation between clinician and patient 
around which the act and action of drug taking took place. My longer-term aim is to work 
with the patient records from the Hillside Hospital, to which I have not been able yet to gain 
access. Here, I focus on the logics mobilized by psychiatric clinicians in their published texts, 
logics in which the patient’s voice is, for multiple reasons (some of which will become 
clearer later in this article), attenuated if not obliterated. Since the outcome of Klein’s logic 
was far-ranging and influential, I believe it is worth analysing. 
 14 
termed a “major tranquilizer,” not least because of its striking effects on the behavior of some 
psychotic patients. These effects raised intriguing problems for psychiatrists and 
pharmacological researchers.
16
 For it was becoming clear to them that they possessed few 
methods not only to assess the effectiveness of drug therapies, but also the effects of other 
treatments (such as lobotomy and electroconvulsive therapy) already within the psychiatric 
therapeutic armamentarium. In the United States, unanswered methodological, 
epistemological and ontological questions about drugs and drug action increasingly 
preoccupied the Committee on Psychiatry of the National Academy of Sciences-National 
Research Council, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and the Committee on 
Research of the American Psychiatric Association. In 1956, a conference on The Evaluation 
of Pharmacotherapy in Mental Illness was organized by the psychiatrist Jonathan Cole
17
 and 
                                                 
16
 David Healy provides a comprehensive overview of the arrival of psychopharmacology, 
including the momentous synthesis of chlorpromazine (David Healy, The Creation of 
Psychopharmacology (Cambridge, MA., 2002); see also Healy, The Antidepressant Era [cit. 
n. 13])). Viola Balz and Volker Hess provide a detailed analysis of the challenges raised by 
chlorpromazine in Germany (Balz and Hess, “Psychopathology and Psychopharmacology: 
Standardisation from the Bottom Up, Using the Example of Neuroleptics,” in Harmonizing 
Drugs: Standards in 20th-Century Pharmaceutical History, ed. Bonah, Christian et al. (Paris, 
2009). See also Thomas A. Ban, “Fifty Years Chlorpromazine: A Historical Perspective,”  
Neuropsychiatr Dis Treat, 3, no. 4 (August 2007): 495–500; Andrew C. Leon, “Evolution of 
Psychopharmacology Trial Design and Analysis: Six Decades in the Making,” The Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry 72, no. 3 (March 2011): 331–40. 
17
 On Cole’s central role in early psychopharmacological research in the United States, see 
Martin M. Katz, “Jonathan O Cole,” Neuropsychopharmacology 35, no. 13 (December 
2010): 2647–2647; Nina R. Schooler, “Jonathan O. Cole, MD (1925-2009): Innovator in 
 15 
by the neurophysiologist Ralph Gerard in order to break new ground. The conference had 
grown out of conversations within and across those committees and organizations, and was 
intended to address the nub of the problem, namely: “Do the drugs act? How do the drugs 
act? What if the drugs act?” The domain of affect would be central in any kind of answer to 
the first question, since any determination regarding therapeutic benefit for psychiatric 
disorders would undoubtedly consider potential affective as well as cognitive transformations 
in the bodies of those ingesting those drugs.   
At the time of that conference, the protocols and frameworks surrounding the 
organization and practice of clinical evaluation in general, and of clinical trials in particular, 
were still very much in flux. Gerard, for example, in outlining to the audience the scope of 
the problems that the field of drug testing in human subjects was facing, emphasized how 
much work there was still to be done in determining “the selection of the experimental and of 
the control populations, the testing conditions, the criteria for evaluating change, the follow-
up procedures, the quantitative judgments and the properties of reporting results.”18 How, he 
                                                                                                                                                       
Clinical Psychopharmacology and of the ECDEU/NCDEU Tradition,” The Journal of 
Clinical Psychiatry 72, no. 3 (March 2011): 286–87. See also Jonathan O. Cole and David 
Healy, “Jonathan Cole: The Evaluation of Psychotropic Drugs,” in The 
Psychopharmacologists: Interviews by Dr David Healy, by Healy, David, vol. 1, 3 vols. 
(London, 1996), 239–63. 
18
 Ralph W. Gerard, “Orientation: Analysis of Program,” in Psychopharmacology: Problems 
in Evaluation. Proceedings of a Conference on The Evaluation of Pharmacotherapy in 
Mental Illness Sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, the National Academy 
of Sciences––National Research Council, and the American Psychiatric Association, 
Washington, D.C., September 18–22, 1956, ed. Cole, Jonathan O. and Gerard, Ralph W. 
(Washington, D.C., 1959), 13. 
 16 
asked, should the timing and dose of the drug be determined? Where should the drug be 
administered? (In order to emphasize the importance of context for determining how 
substance and soma interact, Gerard quipped that “alcohol acts different [sic] in the presence 
of one’s boss or one’s blond.”)19 How do changes in the ward situation during the experiment 
affect drug action? Should one select control populations, and if so, on what grounds does 
one designate them as controls? From whom or from what should one gather and/or elicit 
information about any changes produced by the drug? Gerard’s questions pointed to the 
complex webs that enjoined the drug and the patient’s body to the various worlds in which 
she lived and within which the potential action of the drug might be observed and rendered 
visible. What, exactly, should be held stable for change to be both discerned and measured? 
How might the emergence or attenuation of particular affects in and through patients’ bodies 
be one conduit through which a claim for the effectiveness of a drug’s action might be 
lodged? And what kinds of practices, housed within which kinds of bodies and drawing on 
which kinds of observational skills, would be best placed to discern and measure those 
changes?  
Let us zero in on Jonathan Cole’s deliberations over which aspects of the patient 
needed to be monitored for signs of change, and which technologies and practices of 
observation needed to be mobilized in order to do so. Cole grappled with the fact that, at that 
moment, there was neither general agreement nor any unified codes of practice either in 
relation to describing, or indeed naming, changes in psychopathological behavior, or in 
relation to identifying specific effects that the new drugs helped to bring about. It was on this 
muddled and muddied terrain—a terrain that featured the patient’s body, the 
psychopharmacological substance, the clinical scientist, other clinical care staff and the wards 
in which they were emplaced—that Donald Klein, a few years later, would come to excavate 
                                                 
19
 Ibid., 15. 
 17 
what he argued were ontologically heterogeneous manifestations of anxiety. The crispness of 
Klein’s empirical and conceptual work was underpinned by what he maintained was the near-
surgical precision of one particular drug as it functioned as a psychopharmacological 
dissection tool. As we recognize the boldness of Klein’s manoeuvre, we might do well 
simultaneously to keep in view the dense and heterogeneous landscape—material, 
methodological and epistemological—with which such a manoeuvre had both to reckon and, 
ultimately, to dispense.   
Cole, in his conference presentation, covered a gamut of tools and techniques that 
might be used—starting with clinical rating scales, and moving through interview content 
analysis (of use, he suggested, in fine-grained analyses of progress in psychotherapy, or for 
following the effects of other therapies by dint of frequent psychotherapeutic interviews), 
psychological tests (which included the Rorschach, as well as personality tests used in 
clinical psychology), and physiological evaluation (such as estimating autonomic “reactivity” 
by injecting small doses of sympathetic or parasympathetic drugs to predict response to 
somatic therapy).
20
 Cole was acutely aware of the problems posed by the contemporaneous 
scientific push to increase the scale of psychopharmacological experimentation and analysis. 
For example, he noted that in a study taking place in a large state hospital, a six-item rating 
scale may be superior to a 50-item scale, and concluded—in a sentence that accurately 
presaged the incipient arrival of many short psychiatric ratings scales in psychiatry—that 
“Brief rating scales for judgments of the patient’s psychopathology, to be filled out both by 
the admitting physician and by the nurses and aides, could be of considerable help in 
delimiting better the types of patients helped and in providing easily usable data amplifying 
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the assigned diagnosis”.21 The conference as a whole was, indeed, filled with scientists’ and 
clinicians’ ambitions to push towards larger scales of analysis and evaluation, and with 
recognition of their need for better technologies to track and capture change across large 
vistas of clinical experimentation.  
We see, then, how central geography was to the challenge of assessing affective and 
cognitive change. I use the term geography to connote both the physical spaces in which and 
through which drug action might be adjudicated and measured, and the various socio-spatial 
imaginaries mobilized by clinical researchers. Should the evaluative terrain encompass the 
micro-geographies of conversations between patient and psychoanalyst, or the slightly 
broader circuit between clinician, patient and the technological device of a printed rating 
scale? Or should the focus rather be on the dynamic psycho-sociological topologies of spatial 
interactions and atmospheres within the ward, or on tracing out a temporally dislocated 
geography in which social workers are sent on unexpected visits to discharged patients, 
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beyond the reaches of the hospital and of the locus of the treatment itself?
22
 Even if clarity 
could be acquired about the appropriate socio-spatial context in which to evaluate 
psychopharmacological action, there remained unresolved questions about the accuracy of 
the behavioral and affectively-freighted material that would be acquired. For example, some 
psychoanalytically-oriented researchers worried whether assessing therapeutic change via 
analysing interview content ended up fixating too much on conscious, verbal communication 
and occluded analysis of unconscious motivations and nonverbal modes of communication.
23
  
Perhaps it was not surprising, then, that Cole finished his address by noting that, in 
spite of the clinical and scientific evaluative innovations offered by various technologies, by 
the use of diverse socio-spatial settings, and by the push towards assessing larger numbers of 
patients across multiple sites:  
 
The detailed study of the response to treatment of the individual patient under the 
experienced observer will still, no doubt, provide leads to be tested on a larger group 
of patients.
24
  
 
That statement appears to be a call to order grounded on straightforwardness and simplicity: 
Find one trained observer who can focus on the individual patient! And, indeed, as we shall 
see, much of the potency of Donald Klein’s early scientific innovations arose precisely from 
the act of a small number of experienced observers studying the response to treatment of a 
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small number of patients. There is no doubt that Klein’s achievement in installing panic 
disorder as a new nosological entity was significantly dependent on small-scale, intimate 
geographies, and was not born from big, multi-site experiments that were fantasized about in 
the 1956 drug evaluation conference. But we should not be hoodwinked by the apparent 
simplicity of Cole’s injunction. What constitutes, in practice, the actions and interpretations 
of any one “experienced observer” in psychiatric research is anything but straightforward.25 
  
Creative experimentation in Hillside Hospital  
 Historians of US psychiatry have spent much analytical and empirical energy 
detailing the shifts from psychodynamic models (prominent, for example, in the second 
edition of the DSM) to the classificatory logics of DSM–III.26 Central to that shift towards 
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new classificatory logics was the proliferation in the 1960s and 1970s of psychiatric rating 
scales in relation to both symptoms and diagnoses. This emphasis on ratings in the service of 
standardization, in particular as regards the imperative to ensure reliability in relation to 
psychiatric diagnoses, has had consequences beyond that of directing our focal gaze towards 
1980, the watershed year in which DSM–III was published. One consequence comprises the 
tight bonds that have been drawn between the emergence of psychopharmacology, the 
development of robust clinical protocols, and the overall push towards standardization. This 
narrative of methodological transformation has made it more difficult, perhaps, to keep in 
focus some of the most imaginative and influential early psychopharmacological studies, 
which departed significantly from the driving logic of rating scales with their impetus 
towards a standardization of symptomatology and an elaboration of target symptoms.
27
 My 
focus here will be on the creative experimentation that entangled drugs, bodies, minds and 
affects in a far-from-standardized, early set of experiments that took place in one, small 
psychiatric hospital in the United States in the late 1950s. I am locating our analytic gaze, in 
other words, on a historical-geographical site that is significantly different from the perhaps 
more settled, and perhaps epistemologically less lively, clinical and research landscape that 
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would come to be installed via the logics of the psychiatric randomised controlled trial and, 
subsequently, the framework of DSM-III.  
What kinds of scientific and clinical observation of research patients were sanctioned 
in Klein and Fink’s early psychopharmacological experiments, and how did they help 
consolidate new ontologies of psychopathological anxiety, as well as new kinds of 
interpretations of anxious bodies?
28
 As I emphasized at the start of this article, the affect of 
anxiety was not front and centre in the investigators’ field of vision as these experiments 
commenced. The clinical researchers did not start with a series of questions about how to 
understand the phenomenology of agoraphobic anxiety; rather, the hinge that shifted the 
analytical plane and that served to open up the problematic of anxiety was the introduction of 
the psychopharmacological substances themselves.  
 Hillside Hospital, where those experiments took place, is located in Glen Oaks, Long 
Island.
29
 In 1954, the hospital established research programmes “devoted to an understanding 
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of the mode of action of the psychiatric therapies of the hospital.”30 Hillside Hospital was a 
Jewish hospital—which, in that period, meant being located beyond the orbit and the sphere 
of influence of the large, university-affiliated research hospitals—and was, in the late 1950s, 
largely focused around psychoanalytic therapies. Max Fink, who headed the experimental 
psychiatry research programme, and his colleague Donald Klein (who at that time was a 
Research Associate and a Mental Health Career Investigator funded through the National 
Institute of Mental Health) were developing new methodologies through which to investigate 
the mode of action of drug therapies. And if they were preoccupied with exactly the problems 
enumerated in the 1956 conference on the evaluation of pharmacotherapy—“Do the drugs 
act? How do the drugs act? What if the drugs act?”—they were particularly interested in 
figuring out the answer to a fourth question: In relation to which kinds of patients?  
 They therefore created a laboratory within the psychiatric hospital, and established a 
system through which to control the prescription of psychotropic drugs throughout the 
hospital.
31
 They put procedures in place: all prescriptions were dispensed by a psychiatrist—
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Donald Klein—within the Department of Experimental Psychiatry, who responded to a 
request made by the therapist of the particular patient, and who interviewed the patient prior 
to dispensing the drug. During the period of drug therapy, the patient’s response was assessed 
weekly, and in a variety of ways, from the perspective of various individuals—by the patients 
themselves, by ward staff, by the patient’s therapist and by the therapist’s supervisor. (We 
shall return shortly to how those perspectives were variously weighed for authority and 
clinical importance.) The dosage and the type of medication could be altered. From October 
1958 to October 1959, Klein and Fink treated 120 patients with chlorpromazine, promazine 
or prochlorperazine (all phenothiazines), and 87 patients with imipramine. Imipramine was, 
at that point, a new drug that had emerged through the Swiss psychiatrist Roland Kuhn 
experimentally examining the effects of a Geigy compound. (This compound was similar in 
structure to that of chlorpromazine; it did not appear to have much effect on psychotic 
symptoms, but did appear to reduce the depression of patients diagnosed with schizophrenia. 
Imipramine is now commonly described as the first tryclic antidepressant.)
32
 In an associated 
study, a total of 215 patients received solely imipramine between October 1959 and July 
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1961; Klein and Fink published two seminal papers relating to those two studies.
33
 
Subsequently, after the therapeutic success of those early, open experiments, a randomized, 
placebo trial was carried out.
34
 In assessing drug action, Klein and Fink paid attention to what 
they designated “changes in mental status and hospital adjustment,” “progress in 
psychotherapy,” and “utilization of hospital facilities.” Crucially, the patient’s diagnosis was 
not at stake in the decision over which drug to prescribe, and Klein and Fink also argued that 
current psychodynamic formulations were of no help in predicting course of illness or 
treatment. They therefore jettisoned both existing diagnostic classifications and all 
psychodynamic formulations; instead, they aimed to set aside commonly used frameworks of 
adjudication the better to attend to the bodies and actions of those patients who had received 
drugs from the prescribing physician. “Present techniques of evaluating therapies by global 
improvement scores, imprecise diagnostic classification, and target symptoms abstracted 
from their context were”, they emphasized, “felt to be methodologically inadequate”.35 Klein 
and Fink documented eight distinct patterns of “behavior change” for those treated with the 
phenothiazines and seven for those treated with imipramine. Their underlying claim was that 
the interaction of particular patients with particular drugs allowed the identification of 
distinct “reaction patterns.” The “descriptive behavioral typology” that allowed those reaction 
patterns to become visible was produced through three research psychiatrists reviewing the 
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patients’ detailed records and coming to a consensus “concerning the patient’s behavioral 
reaction during the medication period.”36  
 For our purposes, what is crucial is the pattern that Klein and Fink identified as 
relating to “Episodic Anxiety”: it was this pattern that would, in time, become re-named and 
reimagined as  “panic disorder.”37 Those patients grouped under “Episodic Anxiety” were 
variously characterized, pre-treatment, as experiencing “episodes of felt anxiety and 
helplessness, associated with fearful clinging and urgent demands for aid”,38 or as 
experiencing “the sudden onset of inexplicable ‘panic’ attacks, accompanied by rapid 
breathing, palpitations, weakness, and a feeling of impending death.”39 Notably, they defined 
the “hallmark” of those patients’ condition as “expectant fear of lack of support when 
overwhelmed” (though they also noted that “their condition was often referred to as 
agoraphobia”).40 With phenothiazine (“major tranquilizer”) treatment, these patients’ 
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“episodic anxiety” was unaffected: while the tension they experienced might sometimes be 
reduced, “depressive complaints were not alleviated and phobic limitations on activity 
continued.”41 With imipramine, in notable contrast, “the ‘panic’ attacks ceased, … [although] 
the patients were reluctant to change their phobic behavior pattern and required much 
persuasion, direction and support.”42 The psychiatrists noted, furthermore, in those patients 
showing a positive reaction to imipramine treatment, “a surprising rise in aggressive self-
assertion and rejection in domination”; response to imipramine showed “no special 
relationship to age or sex.”43  
 “Episodic Anxiety” patients provoked particular analytic attention in Klein and Fink 
“because of the apparently paradoxical nature of their drug response”: while the patients were 
clearly very anxious, the phenothiazines—tranquilizers—strangely had no effect, either on 
the particular quality of their anxiety, or on their “phobic limitations.” (These limitations 
included behaviors whereby, “between episodes [of anxiety] they manipulated the staff to 
enable them to remain within the phobically defined safe areas or to have constant attendance 
by aides.”)44 Why were phenothiazines not effective for those patients, but imipramine was 
effective? If Klein and Fink had dramatically succeeded in rendering visible distinctive 
reaction patterns amongst their cohort of patients, they still needed to explain why 
imipramine helped patients with “Episodic Anxiety.” 
   
Panic disorder’s origin story 
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 Klein has offered a number of retrospective reflections on his early experiments at 
Hillside Hospital, in which he has set out, in characteristically vigorous prose, his explanation 
for the action of imipramine.
45
 Notably, Klein has chosen to exemplify the stakes of his 
account by turning to clinical observations that were made regarding one particular male 
patient. Clinical descriptions of this patient’s suffering and treatment we might, indeed, class 
as the origin story of the nosological category of panic disorder.
46
 Through considering this 
origin tale in some detail, we will be able to discern the relation that was traced between the 
practice of observation and the phenomenon that was its object—the relation that 
underpinned Klein’s practice of psychopharmacological dissection. 
 The story begins in Hillside Hospital with the patient’s doctor calling Klein up. The 
doctor described his patient as schizophrenic, and told Klein that treatment with the 
phenothiazine chlorpromazine had made the patient worse. Klein was not convinced that the 
patient was schizophrenic: he was neither delusional nor hallucinating, and manifested no 
thought disorder or restriction of affect. He was, however, Klein emphasized, “hideously 
anxious, extremely dependent, extremely demanding.”47 Klein has described this 
                                                 
45
 Klein’s theoretical architecture would become more elaborate over time, though he has not 
departed from the basic logic of his early accounts.  
46
 The story of this “originary” patient is elaborated in Klein, “Anxiety Reconceptualized” 
(cit. n.6); Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein: Reaction Patterns to Psychotropic Drugs” (cit. 
n.29), 311. Klein also spoke at some length about this patient in his interview with me 
(Donald Klein, Interview by author, Tape recording, The Hamptons, New York, 28–30 July 
2011). In “Anxiety Reconceptualized,” the one patient becomes a group of patients, although 
the structure of the narrative is the same. I refer to a singular patient. 
47
 Klein and Healy, “Donald Klein: Reaction Patterns to Psychotropic Drugs” (cit. n. 29), 
331. 
 29 
experimental and clinical situation as one that allowed him to bring into the same terrain a 
“patient we didn’t know what to do with” and “ a drug [imipramine] … we were unsure what 
it did.” He “mixed them together” through a process that he characterized as “pure 
empiricism.”48 After a couple of weeks of imipramine treatment, there appeared to be no 
change in the patient’s symptoms and the patient was complaining bitterly of his continuing 
anguish. After the third or fourth week, however, the nurses in the wards felt that something 
had altered, though they were unable to put their finger on quite what that was; neither the 
patient nor his therapist nor the therapist’s supervisor believed there to be any change. 
Finally, one nurse—whom Klein has described a number of times as a “good observer”—
pointed out that that patient was no longer running to the nurses every few hours wanting 
help and feeling as though he were dying.
49
 After several more weeks, Klein averred that 
those improvements could not be discounted—even though the patient’s own explanation for 
his behavior was that he had finally realized the nurses could do nothing for him and that he 
was therefore no longer running to them. Indeed, the good doctor is required to point out 
changed behaviour to the unknowing patient: the patient was, on Klein’s account, “stunned” 
since “[h]e had no idea he had changed his behavior.”50  
 Klein has described how he and his colleagues were initially puzzled by the strange 
turn of events. Was the patient primarily depressed rather than anxious or phobic, such that 
the imipramine, with its antidepressant qualities, was lifting his depression and 
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simultaneously alleviating his anxiety symptoms? But “most of the patients [within the 
“Episodic Anxiety” group] neither looked nor acted depressed,” and “thoughts of suicide, 
guilt, and depressive ideas of reference were conspicuously absent.”51 
What Klein characterized as a scene of “pure empiricism” became a scene that—
through the interlocking actions of a drug whose action was uncertain and of observers who 
were not sure what they might be on the look out for—unfurled two distinct ontologies of 
psychopathological anxiety. Klein argued that observations of this originary patient allowed 
him to parse anxiety into two kinds, in contradistinction to the prevailing psychoanalytic 
model of anxiety.
52
 Klein installed “a physiological discontinuity” between what he came to 
term paroxysmal anxiety (which was manifested, for example, when the patient ran to the 
nurses) and the chronic anxiety (from which the patients suffered most of the time).
53
 
Imipramine he interpreted as acting on the paroxysmal anxiety but as having no effect on the 
chronic anxiety because that anxiety was of a different order. Now that Klein had divided 
anxiety into two phenomenological and physiological kinds, he was able—in subsequent 
research and publications—to clarify the link between them. The various phobias that beset 
patients like the “originary” patient, as well as those patients’ chronic and anticipatory 
anxiety, were all directed towards the avoidance of panic attacks: 
 
In other words, what they feared was having a panic attack, particularly having one 
while in a helpless situation. We began to understand why such patients would not 
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drive over a bridge or into a tunnel. The simple answer, without resort to 
psychoanalytic symbolism, was that they realized that once they had committed 
themselves to a bridge or a tunnel there would be no way to stop, so that if a panic 
attack occurred, they would be completely helpless and isolated.
54
 
Klein emphasized that patients’ intense attacks of anxiety came first and were subsequently 
followed by the patterns of phobic avoidance, general anxiety and depressed mood. The 
patients, he claimed, did not realize the difference between the two kinds of anxiety because 
the chronic anxiety submerged the particularity of the panic attacks. (The originary patient’s 
claim, then, that he was no longer running to the nurses because he realized they could do 
nothing for him, was, on Klein’s account, an erroneous post hoc explanation.) Chronic 
anxiety remained, Klein explained, because although imipramine brought patients’ panic 
under control, the patients did not know or believe that this would remain the case. Thus their 
anticipatory anxiety remained and kept in place their avoidant mechanisms (the phobic 
limitations). Klein’s formulations would, in time, assist in establishing panic as a central 
topic for research and treatment. Klein came to understand panic as a kind of “spontaneous” 
attack resulting from a dysfunctional somatic mechanism; he argued that imipramine 
normalized this dysfunctionality.
55
 This, I argue, helped to transform the locus of clinical 
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intervention in cases of panic: consideration of the situations or places in which paroxysmal 
anxiety had occurred was of secondary interest since the prime question was how to cure the 
defective somatic mechanism – which produced the panic – pharmacologically.56   
Klein’s formulations—first developed in his articles from the 1960s, though continuing to 
this day
57—turned upside down established psychiatric wisdom concerning the development 
of paroxysmal anxiety out of chronic anxiety (a formulation that had loosely followed 
Freud’s understanding of anxiety neurosis).58 They also shifted the mise en scène of 
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 Orr has argued that Klein’s “panic-disordered body is defined by an absence of 
relation to any social reason for the force or the timing of its terror. Even within its 
classificatory family of ‘anxiety disorders,’ panic disorder stands out as the psychic response 
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agoraphobia that had been in place since Westphal’s first inquiries into agoraphobia in the 
1870s. The scene of Klein’s pharmacological dissections—the hospital ward and an inpatient 
running panic-stricken to his nurses—moved the spatial imaginary of the disorder away from 
the streets and squares that had up till then formed the primary stage for agoraphobic 
behavior. That Klein’s “originary” panic disorder patient was male rather than female also 
marked a break with many psychiatric and psychoanalytic commonplaces concerning women 
and agoraphobia.
59
 Klein’s model replaced the backdrop of public space with the drama of a 
terrified figure running to be comforted in the closeted space of a hospital ward: at the centre 
of the disorder lay not a problem in negotiating public spaces of exchange and sociality but a 
problem of dependency and need for a substitute mother figure. The tumult of the city 
receded; a small-scale, intimate parent-child drama took its place.  
 
*     *     *     *     * 
 
In the remainder of this article I want to consider in greater detail the practices of clinical 
observation—as well as what I shall call their “intimate geographies”—that accompanied 
those early, creative experiments by Klein and Fink at Hillside Hospital. These are, I believe, 
central to understanding how those experiments helped bring centre stage a 
psychopathological manifestation of affect that would, in time, allow the inauguration of the 
new nosological category of panic disorder. My interest lies in understanding how Klein and 
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Fink responded to the challenges posed in the 1956 conference on the evaluation of 
pharmacotherapy, and how their experiments mobilized particular formulations of 
psychopathological affect. The originary scene that Klein described under a rubric of “pure 
empiricism” drew together a complex network of material objects (e.g. the drug imipramine), 
socio-spatial settings (spaces of psychotherapeutic consultation verus the regular space of the 
ward), discursive elements (the speech of patients, therapists, ward staff), bodily movements 
(patients running, or not running, to their nurses), and changes in affective rhythms and 
demeanours (e.g. increases in patients “aggressive self-assertion” upon taking imipramine). 
For psychopathological anxiety to be transformed from one into two ontologically distinct 
kinds, which elements within this network were prioritized and valorized, and which, 
ultimately, were ignored? The 1956 conference had set out multiple ways of traversing and 
mapping a dense and heterogeneous landscape so as to determine whether, how, and with 
what consequences drugs might “act”. But how widely did Klein and Fink’s map extend? 
How did it end up validating some elements within that landscape and occluding others? And 
is the concept of “purity” (viz. Klein’s claim of “pure empiricism”) apposite in characterizing 
that scientific and clinical scene? 
 
Observing behavior 
 Central to Klein and Fink’s framework for adjudicating drug action was their notion 
of a “behavioral reaction pattern.”60 How did they conceptualize behavior, and what role did 
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 Klein and Fink’s collaborative work followed earlier work by Fink in which he had 
examined behavioral patterns to explore the effects of convulsive therapy (Max Fink, “A 
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affect play? Notably, changes in affect were one of the five criteria—alongside changes in 
symptoms, patterns of communiation and participation in psychotherapy and social activity—
they used to divide patients into groups.
61
 But what was meant by affect? The researchers set 
great store on “gain[ing] a broad image of the patient’s behavior”: not only did they shy 
away from the enumeration of “simple lists of traits and symptoms”, but they also deemed 
batteries of psychological, psychiatric and behavioral indices to be of little use in assisting in 
the carving out of relevant patient subpopulations.
62
 Of the eight behavior change clusters 
that Klein and Fink enumerated, several centred on affect (e.g. “Reduction of Anger,” 
“Affective Stability,” and “Unaffected Episodic Anxiety”). Affect, then, was embedded 
within and helped to constitute the “broad image” of behavior—and was addressed via 
patient demeanour, gestures, actions and expressions. It appeared in a variety of forms, and 
was underwritten by different kinds of evidence that were gathered via different kinds of 
observations by different kinds of people. Those patients placed by Klein and Fink in the 
reaction pattern group “Suppressive Denial,” for example, were distinguished by “a fearful 
suspiciousness accompanied by derogatory ideas of reference.” Claims that they are “fearful, 
agitated, and panicky” were grounded in references to their speech being “evasive” or 
“guarded,” and their social interactions being “hostile, fearfully demanding, and leading to 
mutual withdrawal.” Crucially, one source of observational evidence was the affective 
reactions in those staff interacting with them: these patients were described as “engender[ing] 
uncomfortable feelings in staff personnel, with fears of assaultive behavior.”63 In comparison, 
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the “Somatizing” group was characterized not only by patients’ “chronic use of bodily 
complaints” but by “manipulation as a basis for interpersonal relatedness.” Manipulation was 
evidenced by a fascinating range of affectively tinged behaviors that were interpreted through 
a contrast between patients’ outward expression and their “inner states.” Before treatment 
with phenothiazines, for example, “Somatizing” patients were deemed to be: 
 
friendly during those interactions where they felt that they were about to get their way, 
and depressed, fearful, reproachful, sulky, and covertly angry when their demands were 
denied. Their symptoms and affective upheavals were most prominent in relation ot the 
medical staff, appearing to be role-playing devices rather than expressions of inner 
states.
64
 
  
After treatment with phenothiazines, thse patients responded with “heightened 
manipulation”: the evidence that Klein and Fink marshalled here included “histrionic 
demonstrations of physical distress such as slumping slowly to the floor, wearing a wet towel 
around the head, walking around the corridors leaning against or touching the wall or using 
both hands on the stair bannister”; and the abandoning of hospital activities “as another 
gesture of helpless distress.” Klein and Fink concluded that these patients’ somatic and 
affective complaints seemed “best understood as manipulative communications rather than 
the direct expression of anxiety or depression”; they claimed, furthermore, that “Secondary 
gain is marked, and their illness is utilized in an attempt to maintain a protected dependent 
status.”65  
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 What is noticeable in these descriptions is the range of different frameworks used to 
characterize and interpret both patients’ actions and their displays of affect. Descriptions of 
affect frequently embedded affect within an account of social interaction (either between 
patients, or between a patient and a member of clinical staff) or a verbal exchange (between a 
patient and his/her psychotherapist, or with a member of ward staff). Not infrequently, 
evidence was given that was not necessarily about affect witnessed in the patient, but that 
comprised feelings invoked by the patient in the attending clinical staff. (Clinical staff might 
have been  turning, here, to psychoanalytic principles concerning counter-transference, or to 
other models in which personal feeling was relied upon to assist with diagnosis – such as 
those indebted to Rümke’s “Praecox Gefühl,” which was used to identify schizophrenia.)66 
Sometimes there was the implication that interpretations were being made of patients’ bodily 
and/or facial demeanour, or of the affective timbre of their speech (e.g. “[p]atients now 
approached the interviewer in an ingratiating manner”, or patients “expressed boredom with 
hospital routine”).67 Sometimes, an affectively-tinged descriptor—a patient appearing 
“fearful” or “helpless”—was associated with (inauthentic) “role-play” that ran counter to the 
inner state, and at other times it was invoked as an apparent endorsement of the patient’s 
authentic affective state. Affective displays were often linked to particular kinds of 
encounters in particular socio-spatial contexts (for example, differences were noted between 
how the patient might behave in the context of a psychotherapeutic encounter, in comparison 
with social interactions on the wards). This array of frameworks and modes of gathering 
evidence makes us aware of how heterogeneous the practices of observing, assessing and 
interpreting patient behavour and affect appear to have been within the psychiatric hospital at 
                                                 
66
 Rümke, H. C. “Das Kernsymptom der Schizophrenie und das ‘Praecox Gefühl’,” 
Zentralblatt gesamte Neurologie und Psychiatrie vol. 102 (1942): 168–69. 
67
 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns with Phenothiazine” (cit. n. 29), 451. 
 38 
that moment.
68
 Eric J. Engstrom, in his analysis in this volume of Kraepelin’s late-nineteenth 
and early twentieth-century interest in the role of emotions in psychiatric illness, emphasizes 
Kraepelin’s desire – as manifested in his diagnostic cards (Zählkarten) – to develop ‘reliable 
diagnostic techniques that, in turn, would open the way toward greater prognostic certainty in 
day-to-day clinical practice’.69 How to identify and document details regarding a patient’s 
behaviour, emotions, and cognitive abilities – and how to relate these to a diagnosis – 
remained a challenge for psychiatry through the course of the twentieth century. Nosological 
schemas and modes of identifying and classifying symptoms, behaviours and affects 
remained labile and heterogeneous. Indeed, the fact that there was no uniformly accepted 
method through which to evaluate the patient – and the effect of the drugs on him or her – 
was one strong impetus behind the 1956 conference on The Evaluation of Pharmacotherapy 
in Mental Illness discussed earlier. 
We see how Klein’s and Fink’s published texts intermingle psychoanalytic principles 
and techniques (e.g. the concept of “secondary gain”), both so-called “folk” and “scientific” 
descriptors of affect, and various clinical frameworks used to describe phenomenology, 
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symptomatology and psychopathology (e.g. the concept of “ideas of reference”). They 
always inserted affect into a broader hermeneutic matrix through which to assess changes in 
the patient as a whole. Klein and Fink critiqued the use of “target symptoms” in relation to 
psychopharmacological research—arguing that such a model, by erroneously assuming that 
each manifestation of affect (in the context of a psychopathological symptom) was “identical 
in nature from patient to patient,”70 ended up “implicitly promot[ing] a mosaic view of 
psychopathology.” They went to some lengths to convey how any particular affect might be 
exacerbated or attenuated in very different ways according to the distinctive behavioral 
typology in which it appeared. (For example, phenothiazine treatment had, they argued, very 
different effects on behaviors understood as “anxiety,” depending on the overall behavioral 
reaction group of which anxiety was one part: in the “Somatizing” group, anxiety after 
phenothiazine treatment became “markedly accentuated with much dramatic expressiveness, 
when dealing with psychiatric staff but it was not apparent during the patient’s social 
intercourse,” whereas “anxiety” in the “Episodic Anxiety” was entirely unchanged.)71 They 
concluded that “each symptom represents a prominent facet of various complex adaptations 
… which can be most fruitfully described in a patterned multivariate context.”72  
 What allowed the identification of those temporally and spatially patterned accounts 
of changes in patients’ affective demeanours, gestures and expressions was, Klein and Fink 
made clear, long-term, “expert observation” by psychiatric researchers who knew the 
patients. They disparaged the approach taken in many large hospital programmes, where 
many patients were examined and tested by several raters who were not able to have 
prolonged clinical contact with patients, arguing that “The experienced clinician is our most 
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sensitive cluster analytic device, given the opportunity to use his skills.” (“Cluster analysis” 
emerged in the 1950s, and clustering algorithms began to be used in psychiatry in an attempt 
to “cluster” different groups of patients according to symptomatology. That Klein and Fink 
believed the individual, highly trained observer to trump the technological potency of 
clustering algorithms emphasized how sophisticated they believed that observer’s techniques 
of parsing, amalgamating and discerning to be.)
73
 In contrast to the contemporaneous use of 
rating scales, such as Max Hamilton’s “Assessment of Anxiety States”, which was published 
in 1959, Klein and Fink’s approach constituted the patient’s body as a distinct and complex 
entity that existed in relation to other bodies in particular social settings: it was not something 
that could be dismantled and disaggregated into a tessellation of target symptoms.
74
 
 But not all “expert observation” was regarded with equal esteem by Klein and Fink. 
The observers and their practices documented in their early publications made up a 
collectivity—including Klein and Fink themselves, the ward staff, the psychoanalytic 
psychotherapists and their supervisors, the nursing aides, and the patients—in which certain 
kinds of observation were privileged over others. Where the impact of these differences most 
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obviously came to the surface was when there were differences between Klein’s and Fink’s 
own favoured approach and a judgement that had been gleaned from another mode of 
observation. For example, Klein and Fink, in critiquing the reliance in many 
psychopharmacological evaluations on simplistic psychotherapeutic notions of “cured” or 
“improved”, argued for a means by which the “rich complexity of behavioral change” might 
be registered. Such complexity would not, they implied, be recognized by psychotherapists, 
who might merely rate behavior change negatively because it interfered with the progress of 
psychotherapy, or by ward staff (who might rate the change simply as “positive” because the 
perceived the nursing burden to be alleviated).
75
 Their research also downplayed the 
robustness of much of the evidence gleaned via linguistic utterances (remember Klein’s 
account of the originary patient—in which the therapist discerned no difference in therapy 
after the ingestion of imipramine, and the patient himself was interpreted as providing 
erroneous explanations for the reasons for his own actions). Theodore Porter’s historical 
research on different forms of scientific objectivity is helpful here in allowing us to discern 
the professional and disciplinary jostling over when and how individual expertise ought to be 
trusted over forms of “mechanical objectivity” (such as scales or checklists). Klein and Fink 
are implicitly defending one kind of clinical observation as far more epistemologically robust 
than another kind of clinical observation (poor expertise in the form of psychoanalytic 
techniques of observation), and than the use of symptom check lists (a poor example of 
mechanical objectivity).
76
 
 Klein and Fink attempted to position observations of behavioral changes as a way of 
side-stepping some of the difficulties attendant upon observing and adjudicating changes in 
                                                 
75
 Klein and Fink, “Behavioral Reaction Patterns with Phenothiazine” (cit. n. 29), 457. 
76
 Theodore M. Porter, Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Public 
Life (Princeton, N.J., 1995). 
 42 
patients. But behavior was not as pellucid a means of capturing the potential effects of drug 
action that Klein and Fink might have wished it to have been. As we have already seen, the 
means by which they brought to visibility particular kinds of behaviors rather than others was 
inflected by their interpretations of how behavior emerged in the context of particular kinds 
of communicative actions. Some behaviors Klein and Fink appeared to interpret as not 
possessing ambivalent psychic overlays (e.g. the “helplessness” of the patients who ran to the 
nurses when beset by panic attacks), whereas other behaviors were associated with complex 
psychic motivations (the “dependent façade” of the “Somaticizing” group, who engaged in 
“role-playing” with the nurses, and whose “helpless distress” was seen as a manipulative 
“gesture”). In short, Klein and Fink worked with a complex hermeneutics that ended up 
pulling particular affects and behaviors into analytical visibility and left others, no doubt, in 
the shadows. This is perhaps particularly striking in relation to the prowess of that “keen 
clinical observer”77—who was adjudicated to have spotted the core of what was happening in 
relation to the “helpless” originary patient. For while there were surely multiple behavioral 
transformations that might have been noted after treatment with imipramine, what actually 
was foregrounded and endowed with the greatest significance was the fact that the patient 
was deemed to have stopped running to the nurses several times a day. It was the cessation of 
a particular kind of locomotor behavior—over and above the timbre and specifics of the 
affect of anxiety—that was privileged in Klein and Fink’s account. Paroxysmal anxiety 
became newly visible as a distinct kind of psychopathological affect by dint of the removal 
(post imipramine treatment), of a particular kind of socially communicative locomotor 
behavior.  
 What were Klein and Fink actually seeing? What did they privilege in this scenario of 
“pure empiricism”? While they stressed the importance of attending to behavior, their 
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enumeration of particular bodily actions was buttressed by a theoretical skeleton that 
underpinned their descriptive typology. After all, the patient’s running was not documented 
simply as locomotor action but specifically as a manifestation of helplessness and “fearful 
clinging.” And it was here that the concept of “separation anxiety”, as formulated by the 
psychoanalyst and ethologist John Bowlby, ghosted the empirial scene unfolding in the 
Hillside Hospital.
78
 Bowlby, dissatisfied with the accounts that Freud and later 
psychoanalysts had provided to explain the relationship between the child and mother, turned 
to ethology in order to frame attachment as serving a biological, pro-survival function of 
protection. For Bowlby, anxiety was “a primary response not reducible to other terms and 
due simply to the rupture of the attachment to [the] mother.”79 Klein, borrowing from 
Bowlby,
 80
 decided that early separation anxiety might be a particular kind of evolutionary 
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process. Bowlby had, furthermore, in his seminal paper on separation anxiety, described 
conditions of isolation for the baby as activating both “crying” and “clinging” in relation to 
the mother-figure: “until he is in close proximity to his familiar mother-figure these 
instinctural response systems do not cease motivating him,” such that until this outcome is 
reached “his subjective experience is that of primary anxiety”.81 We can see here how 
Bowlby, in shifting the weight of interpretation away from agoraphobic anxiety concerning 
streets and squares, assisted in establishing a model of phobic anxiety in which attachment 
figures (particularly the mother) were equated with the environment of the home.
82
 Klein and 
Fink superimposed Bowlby’s small-scale dyadic scene featuring a crying, clinging child and 
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a reassuring mother on to the figure of an adult male patient and of a nurse within the space 
of the Hillside Hospital psychiatric ward.  
 
Conclusion 
 Klein and Fink’s early psychopharmacological experiments involved a small number 
of patients and a small number of “expert” clinical observers who inhabited a small 
psychiatric hospital away from the heft of mainstream large university research centres. 
Those experiments would come, in time to have an impact that was both geographically and 
conceptually extensive. For Klein’s work of pharmacological dissection in Hillside Hospital 
acted as the germinator for a diagnosis, panic disorder, that is now firmly embedded in 
multiple countries and across many psychiatric cultures.
83
 Klein and Fink privileged 
particular observational practices as they traced a route through a hermeneutically dense 
terrain composed of heterogeneous patients, heterogeneous drugs, and all manner of “noise” 
vis-à-vis the behavioral features, linguistic utterances and affective transformations that 
might, potentially, be of use in assessing if and how imipramine acted. Those practices 
brought centre stage a particular manifestation of psychopathological anxiety. At a historical 
moment in which the clinical-evaluative drive was towards working with larger numbers of 
patients, larger research sites, and the use of target symptoms and the development of 
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complex rating scales, Klein and Fink’s experiments were characterized by their “intimate 
geographies.”  
 Those geographies were centred on one research site, and entailed the direct 
observation of patients’ bodies—as entire, communicative, and spatially and temporally 
patterned entities—within the ward by clinical researchers and ward staff who knew those 
patients well. The intimacy of those geographies was perhaps dramatized most poignantly by 
the coming to life of Bowlby’s separation-anxiety-disordered infant (in need of her mother) 
in the body of the “episodic anxiety”-disordered male adult patient (in need of the 
reassurance of the nurse). Where Westphal’s case histories had referenced Berlin squares that 
piqued agoraphobics’ fear, Klein’s narrative of his originary patient was one that displaced 
the city and replaced it with the drama of a child-and-parent dyad. The agoraphobia of 
Westphal’s patients was exemplified by their stuttering, stalled passage through the public 
sphere; the panic disorder of Klein’s originary patient was exemplified by a frenzied running 
to the nurse/mother.  
 Klein and Fink mobilized a complex and creative experimental apparatus comprising 
heterogeneous bodies and heterogeneous drugs moving within a particular socio-spatial 
setting. They rendered visible and validated particular interpretations of affective behaviour 
in their consolidation of distinct behavioral reaction patterns—which, in turn, led to Klein’s  
powerful elaboration of the logics of psychopharmacological dissection. David Healy has 
argued that for Klein and Fink: 
 
the new drugs were an experiment that would lead to new observations. The trick was 
to remain open-minded enough to see phenomena that available theories did not 
predict. New theories to explain these observations could be elaborated later. This 
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was almost a new form of science, one that acknowledged that techniques drive 
progress as much as, if not more than, anything else.
84
  
 
But Klein himself has not claimed, in fact, to have made any actual new observations. (He 
has emphasized that Freud had, in fact, described panic attacks “beautifully” in 1895, but, 
argued that Freud’s “theory prevented his observations”.)85 “So, it’s not like it’s a new 
observation”, stated Klein: “What’s new is that I put it together a different way.”86 What was 
new was a complex socio-spatial assemblage that Fink and Klein put together and set into 
motion. We need, I argue, to attend to the spatial as well as temporal specifics of this 
assemblage in order to discern how this new form of psychopathological affect – which 
would come to be termed panic disorder – emerged and then gained epistemological and 
ontological consistency. Through Klein and Fink’s experiments, one drug (imipramine) 
operated in combination with one “good clinical observer”—to which was added the 
compelling overlay of Bowlby’s figure of mother-and-child. Such were the elements that 
brought centre stage one small, affectively dramatic scene. Klein’s analysis of the patient 
running to the nurse allowed him to “singl[e] out panic attack as being the key variable that 
was changing with imipramine”87 and led, in time, to the consolidation of a new nosology of 
anxiety.  
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